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This article is a response to the recent surge of interest over extractive industry in New Zealand and the opposition to this by many iwi. The New Zealand government has in recent years made offshore exploration and production a high priority. By the extractive industry, we mean the people, companies, and activities involved in removing oil and gas, metals, coal, stone and other useful resources from the ground.

In 2021, Aotearoa New Zealand's Foreign Minister, Nanaia Mahuta, sketched out a kaupapa Māori (collective Māori vision) foreign policy for New Zealand based on four tikanga Māori (Māori customary practices and behaviours): manaakitanga (hospitality), whanaungatanga (connectedness), mahi tahi and kotahitanga (unity through collaboration), and kaitiakitanga (guardianship and the protection of intergenerational wellbeing). This article makes a novel contribution to the global International Relations body of literature by questioning to what extent New Zealand's ‘Māori foreign policy’ has been applied to its relationship with China. Through assessing the communications of Mahuta and other officials, it is found that New Zealand is utilizing a kaupapa Māori framework towards China: ‘the taniwha and the dragon’. It is argued that New Zealand is attempting to consolidate the maturity of the Sino-New Zealand relationship, as well as differentiate itself from the other Anglosphere countries that have recently pushed back on China. In doing so, not only is New Zealand something of an outlier, it is demonstrating how eschewing a western-centric understanding of foreign policy for a more relational view based on indigenous knowledge and perspectives (in this case, from te ao Māori: the Māori worldview) can be applied at a time of increasing great power competition.

Restrictions on Indigenous peoples’ contributions to policymaking pervade post-settler societies like Australia, Canada and Aotearoa. Such effects are observed in spite of agreements like Te Tiriti o Waitangi in Aotearoa and the United Nations’ Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. Te Tiriti, negotiated between the British Crown and Māori (Indigenous peoples of Aotearoa), may have been entered into honourably by both parties, but the Crown has consistently resisted its implementation. Contemporary colonialism is characterised by the entrenched and on-going displacement of Indigenous people’s authority by settler states, rationalised by race as a determinant of human worth. Impacts include land alienation, unsustainable resource exploitation and marginalising Indigenous voices from opportunities to make policy consistent with Indigenous values and preferred ways of living. Colonialism normalises institutional racism so that public policy outcomes are persistently unjust. This article describes Critical Tiriti Analysis (CTA), an original contribution to transforming colonial policy, which retrospectively evaluates whether any specific policy document is consistent with Te Tiriti. Substantial interest in CTA from policymakers, practitioners, and scholars led to the development of the tool as a prospective guide to making policy that is consistent with authoritative interpretations of Te Tiriti, and therefore, more likely effective in producing public policies which eliminate inequities. CTA was initially focused on health policy and built on a series of questions that arise from our interpretations of the text of Te Tiriti, contemporary Tiriti scholarship and jurisprudence, and our observations of the ways in which the method is being used by ourselves and others. Although deeply grounded in Aotearoa, we argue that CTA may be transferable to other colonial contexts, such as the Australian where treaties between First Nations and the state are being contemplated, and Canada which has passed legislation to implement the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.

This chapter outlines juris-significant, but unorthodox, ways in which international and domestic law, policy and practice influence each other with respect to Indigenous Peoples’ norms. In the authors’ view, such an approach paints a more comprehensive and accurate picture of the legal dialogue that occurs than orthodox and positivistic legal accounts. The approach also illustrates unique and potentially powerful ways that Indigenous Peoples and other non-state actors can better realise Indigenous Peoples’ rights in their territories. The chapter begins by briefly introducing international legal norms relevant to Indigenous Peoples before contrasting formal understandings of the law with new accounts of the influence of legal norms. The final, and primary, section seeks to capture the relationship between international law and domestic state law and policy. It focuses upon international law’s relationship with the courts, legislature and the executive in Aotearoa (New Zealand), although the broader existence of this intersect is signalled.

Discussion on the special theme for the year: “The Doctrine of Discovery: its enduring impact on indigenous peoples and the right to redress for past conquests (articles 28 and 37 of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples)”.

Standing back, the greatest influence of Indigenous Peoples on international law is our contribution to a pragmatically-driven yet conscious reframing of its foundations. Partly as a result of our participation in international law, it is changing its nineteenth and twentieth century state-centric, colonial, and positivist character to a more informal, flexible, and partially decolonizing system of law. In this way, Indigenous Peoples are crafting a legal system that achieves the “sweet-spot.” It has sufficient “hard-law” quality to restrain the self-interested instincts of powerful states—much needed by Indigenous Peoples seeking to realize their claims against states—and systemic inclusion and justice.

This research, entitled te ao pakihi—the business world—set out to identify Māori enterprise perspectives on the New Zealand-United Kingdom free trade agreement (NZ-UK FTA) being negotiated by Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MFAT) officials and their UK counterparts. In their desire to uphold the Crown’s obligations to Māori under the Treaty of Waitangi, to invoke some of the goals of the Trade for All agenda, and to meet commitments to Māori in trade policy following tribunal claims and the formation of the Te Taumata, MFAT wanted to be informed about Māori interests so that these could be reflected in the negotiations in real time. MFAT commissioned this independent research into Māori enterprise perspectives in March 2021. The research was conducted between April and June 2021 and involved interviews with 50 Māori enterprises with varying degrees of exporting activity, and entity types and scales, including Māori small and medium enterprise (SMEs), Māori post-settlement governance entities (PSGEs), Māori corporates, and Māori providers, among others. Participants were identified and recruited through networks of the research team. Two forms of analysis and reporting were provided: first, a series of six batch reports each summarising the findings of five interviews, with a total of 30 interviewees—the goal was to provide insights as the information came to hand so negotiators could incorporate Māori perspectives during negotiation rounds—and second, a final report with findings from another 24 interviewees, including three from the sixth batch report. We found that that Māori enterprises see trade as more than an economic opportunity: they see the FTA as embodying a Treaty relationship that has significance because it is one with the original Treaty partner—the British Monarch. This relationship provides much cause for optimism among Māori about the potential for trade; however, it also provides cause for caution among Māori enterprises because of historical trauma, and concerns about the dangers of misappropriating and misuse of Māori cultural and intellectual property, and risks to Treaty and other rights. This can be addressed, according to participants, by ensuring Māori are represented at the (negotiating) table, Māori are involved in the implementation, operation, and evaluation of the NZ-UK FTA, and Māori enterprises are supported to build their capability to trade with the UK in a way that respects their identity as Māori enterprises and in accordance with a Māori way of doing business.

The network of diplomatic posts operated by the New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (the Ministry) represent New Zealand on the international stage. Staffed by a combination of diplomatic and locally engaged staff, these posts are New Zealand’s face to the world. A small proportion of the diplomatic staff are Māori (indigenous). Māori art and imagery are used extensively throughout these posts. This research examines the use of Māori (people, images and practices) in New Zealand’s diplomacy. In particular, how specific aspects of New Zealand’s diplomatic practice draw on Māori cultural practices or imagery and what is intended or understood by the symbolism inherent in their use. In the context of the wider physical environment utilized by New Zealand’s offshore presence, these issues are considered through the theoretical lenses of diplomatic symbolism, architectural diplomacy, representation and the use of works of art as image building diplomacy. In addition to a series of semi-structured interviews with key Ministry staff and an analysis of relevant documents of interest, case studies are utilized. Two of these examine how New Zealand is physically represented in an overseas posting environment in two Pacific contexts. One, a long-standing diplomatic representation in Rarotonga in the Cook Islands (part of the Realm of New Zealand which is self-governing in free association with New Zealand – with close cultural ties with Māori in New Zealand), and the second in a newer relationship in Noumea, New Caledonia (an overseas territory of France). The final case study – Canberra- considers New Zealand’s close relationship with Australia. Key research findings illustrate the Ministry (and by extension New Zealand) uses various forms of bicultural symbolism (through the use or display of Māori taonga, objects and art forms) to represent New Zealand internationally. In addition, this use of bicultural symbolism does not adequately consider the disconnect between the outward face of the Ministry and the inward realities (specifically related to the position of Māori staff and the Ministry’s policy function). The research contribution will add to knowledge about New Zealand’s diplomatic thought and practice and address the gap in the literature of how New Zealand has used diplomatic symbolism in relation to Māori to express a collective identity as part of New Zealand’s diplomacy.