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New Zealand is at a watershed in its constitutional and political arrangements. There are three events looming in the short term which suggest that the status of Māori in Parliament is in for significant challenge. The first is the impending review of constitutional issues and the Māori seats as part of the National Party–Māori Party ‘Relationship and Confidence and Supply Agreement’. Secondly, the proposed referendum on the future of the mixed member proportional system (MMP) could also have significant implications for Māori. Finally, the longer term question of whether New Zealand should become a republic continues to haunt New Zealand’s political imagination, and would also necessitate lengthy debates about the place of New Zealand’s constitutional arrangements in relation to Māori rights and Te Tiriti o Waitangi. Māori and Parliament provides a comprehensive and enlightening context for understanding both the historical and contemporary relationship between Māori and Parliament and highlights many of the issues which would arise in any discussion of New Zealand constitutional reform. Māori and Parliament is a collection of nineteen presentations and papers from twenty-one academics, political commentators and current and former parliamentarians and is the result of the Māori and Parliament conference held at Parliament in May 2009.

When considering how Maori political rhetoric fits within the New Zealand political landscape it is necessary to ask what makes such rhetoric distinctive and important. In this paper I examine three areas of distinctly Maori political rhetoric; the unique locations of Maori politics, the formalities to be observed by speakers and the use of particular rhetorical devices by Maori speakers, including the use of Maori language and waiata (song). Given the ways that the distinctive nature of Maori political rhetoric is often undervalued, misinterpreted of misrepresented by many non-Maori, the questions which underlie the discussion here must be around what the implications of this situation are for Maori and non-Maori.

The predominant forms of foreign policy discussed these days are underpinned by an assumption of Crown sovereignty in Aotearoa New Zealand. However, the first diplomatic relations and foreign policy in this country were conducted by hapū and iwi Māori.1 Prior to the 1800s, Māori had a long history of interaction in the Pacific and with other nations. Such interactions were governed by specific legal and political practices and institutions. A number of the concepts upon which these practices and institutions were based included whakapapa (genealogy), utu (balance), mana (respect) and koha (reciprocity).

This article examines what might be included in a definition of Māori political participation that moves beyond a predominant focus on voting in New Zealand general elections. I suggest that the proliferation of Māori governance organisations in recent years means that Māori participation within these organisations must also be considered as part of wider political participation. In addition, I argue that Māori engagement with local authorities deserves further close examination to explore the multiple ways in which political participation occurs. Using a broader definition of Māori political participation and highlighting its many facets indicate that Māori engage in more varied ways in New Zealand politics than previously recognised

When racism is promulgated on a number of fronts, including the media, it becomes a powerful and pervasive force in society, detrimentally impacting on the lives of those who are its object. This paper analyses Mäori focus group interviews that traversed a wide range of sites where racism occurred, including print and broadcast media. We utilised a framework for understanding racism that is in line with key racism theorists and identifies four primary levels through which it operates: internal, interpersonal, institutional and societal. The core themes to emerge in the findings reinforce this framework and have been grouped accordingly: Internalised Racism, Interpersonal Racism, Institutional Racism and Societal Racism. Negative effects on health and wellbeing were articulated by participants as was the call for transformative, counter hegemonic representations of Mäori.

In this article, I outline the existing legislative options available and rationale for Māori representation in local government. I suggest that the arguments and rationale against Māori representation have been exacerbated by a lack of clarity around local government's duties and obligations stemming from the principles of the Treaty of Waitangi. In the second part of this article, I explore more recent arguments by Māori for representation and involvement in local government decision-making on the basis of being mana whenua, which means to have territorial authority and power associated with the possession and occupation of tribal land. This argument foregrounds specific iwi (tribes) as holding territorial authority and therefore rights to representation and involvement in decision-making sourced in tikanga Māori (Māori law), over and above other Māori who live in that area. I examine in detail the Rotorua District Council's establishment of the Te Arawa Partnership Board in 2015 and argue that this Board and its first election results provide unique insights into the relationship between Te Arawa people living in and outside the district and has implications for broader conversations about the rights of Māori living away from their tribal areas.

Research suggests that teaching ‘about’ Māori politics and histories occurs in some schools, but it is extremely limited in terms of quality and quantity (Manning, 2017a, b). The 2001 New Zealand History Teachers Survey indicated Treaty topics were taught by only 3% of teachers nationally (Delahunty, 2010). Today Māori politics or histories are commonly taught only in passing as part of a larger focus on the British inspired political institutions created after the Treaty of Waitangi (Sheehan, Epstein & Harcourt, 2017). The literature which does cover the Treaty usually examines the three Treaty Articles in English and very generally the differences between versions (Orange, 1987; Māori Affairs Select Committee, 2018). The most significant limitation is that what is taught generally fails to acknowledge the existence of Māori political institutions, laws and structures prior to 1840, or to link the Treaty and its legacy, and Treaty principles and obligations within contemporary political and economic contexts.

The election of Evo Morales as the first indigenous President of Bolivia in 2005 is widely credited to the Cochamba Water War (Spronk 2007: 8). The Cochamba Water War progressed from an indigenous movement and a specific issue to the creation of an indigenous political party and election of the first indigenous President. The Bolivian water war, the Puebla Panama Plan in Mexico, the Mackenzie Valley pipeline in Canada (Altamirano‐Jiménez 2004) and Māori resistance to the neoliberal agenda from 1984 onwards (Bargh 2007: 26) inspired much theorising about indigenous people successfully contesting neoliberalism (AltamiranoJiménez 2004, Bargh 2007, Spronk 2007: 8, Postero 2007). Bargh and others, for example, documented not only ‘overt Māori resistance to neoliberal policies, but also more subtle stories of activities, which The neoliberal state, recognition and indigenous rights implicitly challenge neoliberal practices and assumptions by their support for other ways of living’ (Bargh 2007: 1). Scholars make visible the persistence of the colonial in the concrete and material conditions of everyday neoliberal governance and life (Howard-Wagner & Kelly 2011: 103). As Bargh (2007), Altamirano-Jiménez (2013), Howard-Wagner (2010b, 2015) and others note, indigenous categorisations of neoliberal practices as a form of colonisation relate to a concern that neoliberalism in its multiple forms poses a threat to indigenous ways of life. This scholarship also critically reflects on the reshaping of the relationship between the state and indigenous peoples under neoliberalism (Altamirano-Jiménez 2004, Bargh 2007, Howard-Wagner 2009). For example, it draws attention to the increasing intervention in the lives of indigenous peoples (Howard-Wagner 2007, 2009, 2010a, 2010b) and the dispossession of indigenous people through privatisation (Wolfe 2006, Howard-Wagner 2012, Altamirano-Jiménez 2013, Coulthard 2014). It does not, however, preclude agency, resistance and decolonisation. Interpretive micro-studies about indigenous peoples’ engagement with neoliberalism provide particular value. They tell us about actually existing neoliberalism in the context of intervention in the everyday lives of indigenous peoples, contests over rights, contests over policy and the complex decisions indigenous people are making about how to protect their rights and navigate diverse economies involving neoliberal policies and practices.

Colonial praxis has been imposed on the culture, epistemologies and praxis of indigenous Maori in Aotearoa, entrenching the settler cultural project that ensures the continuation of the colonial state, producing damaging disparities. This article theorises ways in which settler privilege works at multiple levels supporting settler interests, aspirations and sensibilities. In institutions, myriad mundane processes operate through commerce, law, media, education, health services, environment, religion and international relations constituting settler culture, values and norms. Among individuals, settler discursive/ideological frameworks are hegemonic, powerfully influencing interactions with Maori to produce outcomes that routinely suit settlers. In the internalised domain, there is a symbiotic sense of belonging, rightness, entitlement and confidence that the established social hierarchies will serve settler interests. This structure of privilege works together with overt and implicit acts of racism to reproduce a collective sense of superiority. It requires progressive de-mobilising together with anti-racism efforts to enable our society to move toward social justice.

The association of Māori and crime was prominent in a large representative sample of newspaper items gathered in Aotearoa New Zealand between November 2007 and April 2008. We used content, thematic/discursive analyses as well as focus group insights to analyse the data-base and found that Māori were frequently labelled as possible or actual perpetrators of crime on superficial judgements, often by victims. This practice associates Māori with all accounts of crime and embeds crime as a background for all other items about Māori. In contrast, newspaper coverage of Pākehā perpetrators of crime against a Māori organisation worked to valorise the convicted thieves. The embedding of crime as a background to other stories about Māori, the pervasive but unacknowledged norms, and media positioning of Māori as a threat in non-crime stories, is central to hegemonic discourses of Māori-Pākehā relations. Focus group participants indicated that these discourses support realworld marginalisation and discrimination against Māori.

A content analysis of editorial items about Māori issues and the Treaty of Waitangi in 14 Suburban Newspaper publications in Auckland and Northland found a low proportion of articles about these issues, despite high proportions of Māori resident in several areas served by these publications. Stories included a higher proportion of apparent news releases compared to a national sample of non-daily papers. Māori perspectives came largely from sources representing pan-Māori non-government organisations; Suburban Newspapers used a low proportion of iwi and hapū sources compared with other community papers. Use of te reo Māori was low, and there were no signs of attempts to support readers in learning or increasing their understanding of te reo Māori. This article concludes that Māori and non-Māori readers are poorly served by the poverty of Suburban Newspapers’ reporting of Treaty and Māori issues.

Statistics from the New Zealand Electoral Commission (2013) show that only 55% of those who indicate they are of Māori descent are enrolled on the Māori electoral roll. In this paper, we aim to find the statistical predictors of being enrolled to vote on the Māori roll versus being enrolled on the general roll. We present two models analysing demographic and psychological aspects of people’s subjective identification as Māori to predict enrolment on the Māori roll. In model 1, demographic variables from participants of Māori ancestry involved in a national probability sample (N=1,961) were analysed to predict enrolment on the Māori roll. In model 2, data from a subsample of people who identify as Māori (N=662) were analysed to assess the impact of both demographics and identity on electoral roll choice. The dimensions Higher Group Membership Evaluation (the extent to which someone thinks that being Māori is positive and part of their self-concept) and Higher Socio-Political Consciousness (engagement with Māori political issues) predicted enrolment on the Māori roll. Our findings will be useful for those looking to increase Māori roll enrolment and may also help to combat deficit-based arguments for the abolition of the Māori seats.

To be Māori is to be political. Our history is filled with political struggles and victories. These struggles, originating from experiences of colonisation and assimilation, have greatly influenced what it is to be Māori today. This thesis explores the relationship between Māori ethnic identity, and political attitudes and outcomes. In this thesis, I present five studies (across four published papers and one full manuscript) which validate the Multidimensional Model of Māori Identity and Cultural Engagement (MMM-ICE2). I focus particular attention on the scale’s Socio- Political Consciousness dimension, and illustrate the links between identity and politics for Māori. The MMM-ICE2 is a seven-dimension scaled designed with Māori, by Māori, and for Māori to measure Māori ethnic identity (Houkamau & Sibley, 2010, 2015a). In the first two studies, I focus on using psychometric techniques to further validate the MMM-ICE2 as a measurement tool. Firstly, I use random intercept exploratory factor analysis to show that the scale is not vulnerable to acquiescent responding (yea-saying; Greaves, Houkamau, & Sibley, 2017). The second study uses multigroup confirmatory factor analysis to illustrate that the MMM-ICE2 shows reasonable measurement equivalence across diverse Māori groups (Greaves, Manuela et al., 2017). In the third study of the thesis, I demonstrate that Māori, broadly defined, are more likely to vote for the political left – the Labour, Green, and New Zealand First parties – over the centre-right National Party (Greaves, Robertson et al., 2017). The results lay the groundwork for two further studies, which demonstrate the construct validity of the Socio-Political Consciousness dimension of the scale by predicting a range of political attitudes and behaviours. Study Four shows that, above and beyond the effects of demographics, Māori enrolled to vote on the Māori electoral roll were higher on the Socio-Political Consciousness and Group Membership Evaluation dimensions (Greaves, Osborne, Houkamau, & Sibley, 2017). Additionally, in Study Five, I demonstrate that higher Socio-Political Consciousness for Māori is related to higher levels of support for Māori rights protests, the left-wing Green Party, and the Māori-issue focussed, Māori and Mana political parties (Greaves, Sengupta et al., 2017). Yet, lower levels of Socio-Political Consciousness were related to higher support for the right-wing National Party. Taken together, these studies show that the MMM-ICE2 scale and the Socio-Political Consciousness dimension can predict important, realworld political outcomes and attitudes for Māori. Finally, I discuss the contributions that the papers in this thesis have made to the literature, and the inevitable limitations of the research. I then provide future research directions for the study of quantitative Māori identity and for Māori political participation more generally. I finish with reflections on the process of writing this thesis and on being an emerging Māori quantitative researcher.

Reconciliation brings together Christological and anthropological dimensions of human thought to illustrate the nexus between religious principles and political means. For the state reconciliation is concerned with social cohesion and political stability. For the church, it extends the sacramental notion of reconciliation between God and penitent to public relationships. This article examines Roman Catholic contributions to secular reconciliation debates. It shows how religious precepts create moral imperatives to engagement with secular discourses as a necessary element of Christian mission. It also argues that the church’s role in the disruption of indigenous societies creates an additional moral imperative to engage in reconciliation as mission and to articulate a Christian vision of indigenous rights.

Indigenous peoples inevitably associate globalization with imperial expansion and the colonization of their territories. One associated scholarly view is that globalization's focus on capital accumulation sets aside indigenous cultural priorities to undermine self-determining authority over lands and resources (Fenelon and Hall, 2008; Friedman, 1999; Kelsey, 2005a, 2005b; Stewart-Harawira, 2005). Alternatively, globalization is an ambiguous paradox also providing significant benefits to indigenous peoples. In two very different Pacific countries, Fiji and New Zealand, the globalization of political and jurisprudential thought on the rights of indigeneity provides a significant counter to state assertions of absolute sovereignty. Globalization creates economic opportunities to reduce indigenous dependence on the state and in its contemporary expression is less significant than domestic factors in inhibiting indigenous aspirations.

Christian public theology extends reconciliation beyond its principal sacramental concern for relationships between God and penitent to the construction of ‘socially just’ public relationships for the settlement of intra-national conflict. In theological terms, reconciliation brings public relationships into what Hally calls ‘the Christ narrative of passion, death and resurrection’ in which the perpetrators of injustice repent and seek forgiveness. This article introduces the conflicts that these discourses aim to resolve in Australia, Fiji and New Zealand and explains and contrasts reconciliation’s relative importance in each of these jurisdictions. Moreover, the article’s cross-jurisdictional comparison shows reconciliation’s limits and possibilities as public theology, and argues that in Australia and New Zealand it has helped to create political environments willing to admit indigenous perspectives on a range of policy issues. On the contrary, however, the article also shows that the Fijian churches have distorted the concept of reconciliation to support political imperatives that are difficult to rationalize theologically, even though they are presented by the churches as being concerned with religious goals.

This chapter draws on New Zealand examples to contextualize its assessment of reconciliation as public memory in Australian policy discourse. The Treaty of Waitangi has provided the rationale and framework for successive New Zealand governments to say sorry for acts of aggression against Maori tribes. In New Zealand, sorrow is expressed through Acts of Parliament that serve not only as instruments of restitution but as symbols of public memory. Faith and memory are similarly important to wider Christian treaty discourses, as it was Anglican missionaries who drafted the agreement and translated it from English to Maori. The Pastoral letter is drawn into Catholic public memory to justify the development of a public theology of reconciliation. Self-determination belongs first and foremost to individuals, but in Catholic teaching the human person is fundamentally social and exercises the rights and responsibilities of their human being in association with others.