Your search

I argue environmental disasters are an inevitable outcome of the underdevelopment of Western philosophy. Human induced environmental disasters are unfortunate, an unintended consequence of focusing on economic maximization in a culture without comprehensive, clearly accepted, and operationalized frameworks for environmental and intergenerational justice. However, they are of no surprise to Indigenous Peoples relegated to margins of political influence. Grounding this claim, I examine the New Zealand High Court case Greenpeace and Te Whanau-ā-Apanui vs the Minister for Energy. Case documents afford comparisons between the complex philosophic, legal, and cultural framework of Māori, that protect human and nonhuman from human-induced environmental disaster, and the dominant Anglo framings. I observe a philosophical deficit underpinning the legal and political system of Aotearoa that impedes environmental intergenerational justice. These philosophic foundations, intentionally or not, promote environmental disaster and – nationally and internationally – claim a dominant position over Indigenous systems.

A television news bulletin tells us, in effect, what we should think about and the preferred way in which we should think about it. Analyses of New Zealand media have consistently shown that news about Māori is both relatively rare and that it prioritises violence and criminality. Researchers conclude this encourages New Zealanders to see Māori as threatening the social order and burdening our society. We examined the few Māori stories broadcast in a large representative sample of English-language television news bulletins and found the same negativity. As our sample included Māori-language news bulletins from the same days we know there were other Māori news stories available, so we conclude that the prioritising of negative stories about Māori in English-language media is a matter of choice. Focus groups with Māori and non-Māori media consumers demonstrate the impact of the relentlessly negative portrayals of Māori in New Zealand media.

In December 2002 a new Local Government Act was passed into statute. Much of the literature, submissions, articles and commentaries leading up to the passing of the Act indicated that a new Act had to clarify the relationships and obligations between local government, the Crown, Maori and the Treaty of Waitangi. In this paper I argue that the new Act has not adequately clarified these relationships and obligations, and that there are particular reasons and consequences arising from this situation. The reasons surround denials from local government that they are the Crown and central government's vested interest in allowing slippage to continue. If we examine the example of the General Agreement on Trade in Services we can see that a failure to clarify the relationships may have detrimental consequences for Maori to protect their rights.

The Foreshore and Seabed Act 2004 caused many New Zealanders grave concern. In this article I suggest that a number of the Government's actions since the passing of the Foreshore and Seabed Act bring into question several of its central claims for legislating and the subsequent overriding of Tiriti o Waitangi and human rights laws. As a result, I argue that the inadequacy in our constitutional arrangements requires a change of approach—a new game plan: constitutional change. The second part of the article examines the work of the Maori Party. Its actions in encouraging an increasing level of Maori politicisation away from expression outside the State and towards the electoral process, arising out of opposition to the Foreshore and Seabed Act, constitute another changing of game plans. The article concludes by emphasising how the Foreshore and Seabed Act has encouraged us to take a longer term vision in order to foster more positive relations, a vision that encompasses the need for genuine constitutional change based on respect for human rights and Te Tiriti o Waitangi.

This article examines what might be included in a definition of Māori political participation that moves beyond a predominant focus on voting in New Zealand general elections. I suggest that the proliferation of Māori governance organisations in recent years means that Māori participation within these organisations must also be considered as part of wider political participation. In addition, I argue that Māori engagement with local authorities deserves further close examination to explore the multiple ways in which political participation occurs. Using a broader definition of Māori political participation and highlighting its many facets indicate that Māori engage in more varied ways in New Zealand politics than previously recognised

When racism is promulgated on a number of fronts, including the media, it becomes a powerful and pervasive force in society, detrimentally impacting on the lives of those who are its object. This paper analyses Mäori focus group interviews that traversed a wide range of sites where racism occurred, including print and broadcast media. We utilised a framework for understanding racism that is in line with key racism theorists and identifies four primary levels through which it operates: internal, interpersonal, institutional and societal. The core themes to emerge in the findings reinforce this framework and have been grouped accordingly: Internalised Racism, Interpersonal Racism, Institutional Racism and Societal Racism. Negative effects on health and wellbeing were articulated by participants as was the call for transformative, counter hegemonic representations of Mäori.

In this article, I outline the existing legislative options available and rationale for Māori representation in local government. I suggest that the arguments and rationale against Māori representation have been exacerbated by a lack of clarity around local government's duties and obligations stemming from the principles of the Treaty of Waitangi. In the second part of this article, I explore more recent arguments by Māori for representation and involvement in local government decision-making on the basis of being mana whenua, which means to have territorial authority and power associated with the possession and occupation of tribal land. This argument foregrounds specific iwi (tribes) as holding territorial authority and therefore rights to representation and involvement in decision-making sourced in tikanga Māori (Māori law), over and above other Māori who live in that area. I examine in detail the Rotorua District Council's establishment of the Te Arawa Partnership Board in 2015 and argue that this Board and its first election results provide unique insights into the relationship between Te Arawa people living in and outside the district and has implications for broader conversations about the rights of Māori living away from their tribal areas.

Research suggests that teaching ‘about’ Māori politics and histories occurs in some schools, but it is extremely limited in terms of quality and quantity (Manning, 2017a, b). The 2001 New Zealand History Teachers Survey indicated Treaty topics were taught by only 3% of teachers nationally (Delahunty, 2010). Today Māori politics or histories are commonly taught only in passing as part of a larger focus on the British inspired political institutions created after the Treaty of Waitangi (Sheehan, Epstein & Harcourt, 2017). The literature which does cover the Treaty usually examines the three Treaty Articles in English and very generally the differences between versions (Orange, 1987; Māori Affairs Select Committee, 2018). The most significant limitation is that what is taught generally fails to acknowledge the existence of Māori political institutions, laws and structures prior to 1840, or to link the Treaty and its legacy, and Treaty principles and obligations within contemporary political and economic contexts.

Colonial praxis has been imposed on the culture, epistemologies and praxis of indigenous Maori in Aotearoa, entrenching the settler cultural project that ensures the continuation of the colonial state, producing damaging disparities. This article theorises ways in which settler privilege works at multiple levels supporting settler interests, aspirations and sensibilities. In institutions, myriad mundane processes operate through commerce, law, media, education, health services, environment, religion and international relations constituting settler culture, values and norms. Among individuals, settler discursive/ideological frameworks are hegemonic, powerfully influencing interactions with Maori to produce outcomes that routinely suit settlers. In the internalised domain, there is a symbiotic sense of belonging, rightness, entitlement and confidence that the established social hierarchies will serve settler interests. This structure of privilege works together with overt and implicit acts of racism to reproduce a collective sense of superiority. It requires progressive de-mobilising together with anti-racism efforts to enable our society to move toward social justice.

The association of Māori and crime was prominent in a large representative sample of newspaper items gathered in Aotearoa New Zealand between November 2007 and April 2008. We used content, thematic/discursive analyses as well as focus group insights to analyse the data-base and found that Māori were frequently labelled as possible or actual perpetrators of crime on superficial judgements, often by victims. This practice associates Māori with all accounts of crime and embeds crime as a background for all other items about Māori. In contrast, newspaper coverage of Pākehā perpetrators of crime against a Māori organisation worked to valorise the convicted thieves. The embedding of crime as a background to other stories about Māori, the pervasive but unacknowledged norms, and media positioning of Māori as a threat in non-crime stories, is central to hegemonic discourses of Māori-Pākehā relations. Focus group participants indicated that these discourses support realworld marginalisation and discrimination against Māori.

Policies increasingly reinforce the self-determination of Indigenous peoples, but issues remain around group definitions. Colonization has led to (de)identification with Māori (New Zealand's Indigenous peoples) identity markers. We explore differences between Māori on combinations of descent, ethnicity and Iwi (extended kinship group) knowledge in the 2013 Census, and self-reported discrimination. There were six groups within the Māori descent population: two did not know their Iwi – some identified solely as Māori ethnicity (2.8 per cent) – or Māori plus another ethnicity(-ies; 6.8 per cent); two did not identify as Māori ethnicity: more named their Iwi (7.2 per cent), than not (6.9 per cent); the largest groups knew their Iwi and identified as Māori ethnicity, either solely (30.8 per cent), or alongside another ethnicity(-ies; 34.3 per cent). We found a pattern of differences across demographics and discrimination, highlighting the complexity of Māori identity and the need to account for differences within Indigenous groups.

A content analysis of editorial items about Māori issues and the Treaty of Waitangi in 14 Suburban Newspaper publications in Auckland and Northland found a low proportion of articles about these issues, despite high proportions of Māori resident in several areas served by these publications. Stories included a higher proportion of apparent news releases compared to a national sample of non-daily papers. Māori perspectives came largely from sources representing pan-Māori non-government organisations; Suburban Newspapers used a low proportion of iwi and hapū sources compared with other community papers. Use of te reo Māori was low, and there were no signs of attempts to support readers in learning or increasing their understanding of te reo Māori. This article concludes that Māori and non-Māori readers are poorly served by the poverty of Suburban Newspapers’ reporting of Treaty and Māori issues.

Statistics from the New Zealand Electoral Commission (2013) show that only 55% of those who indicate they are of Māori descent are enrolled on the Māori electoral roll. In this paper, we aim to find the statistical predictors of being enrolled to vote on the Māori roll versus being enrolled on the general roll. We present two models analysing demographic and psychological aspects of people’s subjective identification as Māori to predict enrolment on the Māori roll. In model 1, demographic variables from participants of Māori ancestry involved in a national probability sample (N=1,961) were analysed to predict enrolment on the Māori roll. In model 2, data from a subsample of people who identify as Māori (N=662) were analysed to assess the impact of both demographics and identity on electoral roll choice. The dimensions Higher Group Membership Evaluation (the extent to which someone thinks that being Māori is positive and part of their self-concept) and Higher Socio-Political Consciousness (engagement with Māori political issues) predicted enrolment on the Māori roll. Our findings will be useful for those looking to increase Māori roll enrolment and may also help to combat deficit-based arguments for the abolition of the Māori seats.

The article argues that Maori political participation in New Zealand constitutes a positive example of how the current international standards on indigenous political participation can be implemented at the national level. Notwithstanding the weaknesses of the system and the challenges laying ahead, the combination of the Mixed Member Proportional electoral system, dedicated Maori seats and the establishment of the Maori Party have ensured a Maori voice in Parliament and have broadened the possibilities of effective indigenous participation in the political life of the state. Such state practice that implements the 2007 UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples firmly confirms the position of the Declaration within current international law.

This paper briefly explores the background to Maori representation in Parliament before tracing the development of Labour's acquisition of the Maori vote up until 1996. It then considers the reasons for the loss of that loyalty at the 1996 General Election. It is argued that the populist Maori leader and the deputy leader of the New Zealand First Party had enormous appeal for Maori voters. The impact of this populism and of the MMP electoral system on the Maori electorate is examined. The nature of Labour's response to this unprecedented surge in Maori support for a minor party, and the dynamics of the Maori electoral population are further themes of the paper. Some of the strategies and attitudes Labour must adopt if it is to regain that Maori confidence are also explored.

This paper argues that self-determination to the greatest extent possible is a legitimate aspiration for Maori people. It is argued that in education this requires a philosophical and policy response more focused on Maori autonomy than can be provided within the bicultural framework that has lately informed Maori relationships with other actors in the education arena. The paper considers the place of kohanga reo, kura kaupapa Maori and wananga in relation to broader Maori aspirations for self-determination and discusses proposals that these aspirations be furthered through the establishment of a Maori Education Authority. It is also argued that opportunities for self-determination in New Zealand are compromised by the government's unwillingness to alter a tightly controlled centralised education market to provide genuine Māori autonomy over what type of education might be available and to what end.

In 2004 the appointment of a Coordinating Minister Race Relations, signalled a shift in elite Māori policy thinking from a long-standing cautious bipartisan acceptance of selfdetermination towards a re-emergent assimilationist ‘one law’ for all discourse. The question simplistically posed by the Leader of the Opposition was should welfare entitlements be granted on the basis of need or race (Brash 2004)? Beneath this question lies an ideological assumption which privileges assimilation over indigeneity as the basis of Māori participation in public affairs. This paper therefore asks: are Māori peoples with rights, or individuals with needs? Is there a deeper politics of indigeneity providing a legitimate foundation for rights which are not necessarily superior to the rights of citizenship, but are important and distinguishable adjuncts? These questions transcend the issue of welfare entitlements to wider questions about the nature and terms of Māori belonging to the liberal polity. The paper highlights the political tension between government attempts to remove indigeneity from the public agenda in response to populist pressure and a pragmatic acceptance that New Zealand ‘needs’ Māori to increase their contribution to the national economy and that the realisation of this goal may in fact depend on the fuller citizenship imagined by the politics of indigeneity.

This paper identifies three discourses that are prominent in contemporary Treaty of Waitangi policy debate, each with significantly different implications for Maori political status within the modern nation-state. At one extreme the Treaty's significance is exaggerated by overemphasis on partnership as an implicit Treaty principle. At another extreme the Treaty's significance is understated by an assimilationist position that denies the Treaty's relevance to Indigenous rights which, in turn, imposes serious constraint on the extent to which partnership can actually develop into comprehensive policy practice. An alternative position is one that sees the Treaty, which is supported in international law, as affirming a twofold conception of citizenship as the basis of both individual and collective Maori rights.