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The election of Evo Morales as the first indigenous President of Bolivia in 2005 is widely credited to the Cochamba Water War (Spronk 2007: 8). The Cochamba Water War progressed from an indigenous movement and a specific issue to the creation of an indigenous political party and election of the first indigenous President. The Bolivian water war, the Puebla Panama Plan in Mexico, the Mackenzie Valley pipeline in Canada (Altamirano‐Jiménez 2004) and Māori resistance to the neoliberal agenda from 1984 onwards (Bargh 2007: 26) inspired much theorising about indigenous people successfully contesting neoliberalism (AltamiranoJiménez 2004, Bargh 2007, Spronk 2007: 8, Postero 2007). Bargh and others, for example, documented not only ‘overt Māori resistance to neoliberal policies, but also more subtle stories of activities, which The neoliberal state, recognition and indigenous rights implicitly challenge neoliberal practices and assumptions by their support for other ways of living’ (Bargh 2007: 1). Scholars make visible the persistence of the colonial in the concrete and material conditions of everyday neoliberal governance and life (Howard-Wagner & Kelly 2011: 103). As Bargh (2007), Altamirano-Jiménez (2013), Howard-Wagner (2010b, 2015) and others note, indigenous categorisations of neoliberal practices as a form of colonisation relate to a concern that neoliberalism in its multiple forms poses a threat to indigenous ways of life. This scholarship also critically reflects on the reshaping of the relationship between the state and indigenous peoples under neoliberalism (Altamirano-Jiménez 2004, Bargh 2007, Howard-Wagner 2009). For example, it draws attention to the increasing intervention in the lives of indigenous peoples (Howard-Wagner 2007, 2009, 2010a, 2010b) and the dispossession of indigenous people through privatisation (Wolfe 2006, Howard-Wagner 2012, Altamirano-Jiménez 2013, Coulthard 2014). It does not, however, preclude agency, resistance and decolonisation. Interpretive micro-studies about indigenous peoples’ engagement with neoliberalism provide particular value. They tell us about actually existing neoliberalism in the context of intervention in the everyday lives of indigenous peoples, contests over rights, contests over policy and the complex decisions indigenous people are making about how to protect their rights and navigate diverse economies involving neoliberal policies and practices.

Colonial praxis has been imposed on the culture, epistemologies and praxis of indigenous Maori in Aotearoa, entrenching the settler cultural project that ensures the continuation of the colonial state, producing damaging disparities. This article theorises ways in which settler privilege works at multiple levels supporting settler interests, aspirations and sensibilities. In institutions, myriad mundane processes operate through commerce, law, media, education, health services, environment, religion and international relations constituting settler culture, values and norms. Among individuals, settler discursive/ideological frameworks are hegemonic, powerfully influencing interactions with Maori to produce outcomes that routinely suit settlers. In the internalised domain, there is a symbiotic sense of belonging, rightness, entitlement and confidence that the established social hierarchies will serve settler interests. This structure of privilege works together with overt and implicit acts of racism to reproduce a collective sense of superiority. It requires progressive de-mobilising together with anti-racism efforts to enable our society to move toward social justice.

The association of Māori and crime was prominent in a large representative sample of newspaper items gathered in Aotearoa New Zealand between November 2007 and April 2008. We used content, thematic/discursive analyses as well as focus group insights to analyse the data-base and found that Māori were frequently labelled as possible or actual perpetrators of crime on superficial judgements, often by victims. This practice associates Māori with all accounts of crime and embeds crime as a background for all other items about Māori. In contrast, newspaper coverage of Pākehā perpetrators of crime against a Māori organisation worked to valorise the convicted thieves. The embedding of crime as a background to other stories about Māori, the pervasive but unacknowledged norms, and media positioning of Māori as a threat in non-crime stories, is central to hegemonic discourses of Māori-Pākehā relations. Focus group participants indicated that these discourses support realworld marginalisation and discrimination against Māori.

Policies increasingly reinforce the self-determination of Indigenous peoples, but issues remain around group definitions. Colonization has led to (de)identification with Māori (New Zealand's Indigenous peoples) identity markers. We explore differences between Māori on combinations of descent, ethnicity and Iwi (extended kinship group) knowledge in the 2013 Census, and self-reported discrimination. There were six groups within the Māori descent population: two did not know their Iwi – some identified solely as Māori ethnicity (2.8 per cent) – or Māori plus another ethnicity(-ies; 6.8 per cent); two did not identify as Māori ethnicity: more named their Iwi (7.2 per cent), than not (6.9 per cent); the largest groups knew their Iwi and identified as Māori ethnicity, either solely (30.8 per cent), or alongside another ethnicity(-ies; 34.3 per cent). We found a pattern of differences across demographics and discrimination, highlighting the complexity of Māori identity and the need to account for differences within Indigenous groups.

A content analysis of editorial items about Māori issues and the Treaty of Waitangi in 14 Suburban Newspaper publications in Auckland and Northland found a low proportion of articles about these issues, despite high proportions of Māori resident in several areas served by these publications. Stories included a higher proportion of apparent news releases compared to a national sample of non-daily papers. Māori perspectives came largely from sources representing pan-Māori non-government organisations; Suburban Newspapers used a low proportion of iwi and hapū sources compared with other community papers. Use of te reo Māori was low, and there were no signs of attempts to support readers in learning or increasing their understanding of te reo Māori. This article concludes that Māori and non-Māori readers are poorly served by the poverty of Suburban Newspapers’ reporting of Treaty and Māori issues.

Statistics from the New Zealand Electoral Commission (2013) show that only 55% of those who indicate they are of Māori descent are enrolled on the Māori electoral roll. In this paper, we aim to find the statistical predictors of being enrolled to vote on the Māori roll versus being enrolled on the general roll. We present two models analysing demographic and psychological aspects of people’s subjective identification as Māori to predict enrolment on the Māori roll. In model 1, demographic variables from participants of Māori ancestry involved in a national probability sample (N=1,961) were analysed to predict enrolment on the Māori roll. In model 2, data from a subsample of people who identify as Māori (N=662) were analysed to assess the impact of both demographics and identity on electoral roll choice. The dimensions Higher Group Membership Evaluation (the extent to which someone thinks that being Māori is positive and part of their self-concept) and Higher Socio-Political Consciousness (engagement with Māori political issues) predicted enrolment on the Māori roll. Our findings will be useful for those looking to increase Māori roll enrolment and may also help to combat deficit-based arguments for the abolition of the Māori seats.

To be Māori is to be political. Our history is filled with political struggles and victories. These struggles, originating from experiences of colonisation and assimilation, have greatly influenced what it is to be Māori today. This thesis explores the relationship between Māori ethnic identity, and political attitudes and outcomes. In this thesis, I present five studies (across four published papers and one full manuscript) which validate the Multidimensional Model of Māori Identity and Cultural Engagement (MMM-ICE2). I focus particular attention on the scale’s Socio- Political Consciousness dimension, and illustrate the links between identity and politics for Māori. The MMM-ICE2 is a seven-dimension scaled designed with Māori, by Māori, and for Māori to measure Māori ethnic identity (Houkamau & Sibley, 2010, 2015a). In the first two studies, I focus on using psychometric techniques to further validate the MMM-ICE2 as a measurement tool. Firstly, I use random intercept exploratory factor analysis to show that the scale is not vulnerable to acquiescent responding (yea-saying; Greaves, Houkamau, & Sibley, 2017). The second study uses multigroup confirmatory factor analysis to illustrate that the MMM-ICE2 shows reasonable measurement equivalence across diverse Māori groups (Greaves, Manuela et al., 2017). In the third study of the thesis, I demonstrate that Māori, broadly defined, are more likely to vote for the political left – the Labour, Green, and New Zealand First parties – over the centre-right National Party (Greaves, Robertson et al., 2017). The results lay the groundwork for two further studies, which demonstrate the construct validity of the Socio-Political Consciousness dimension of the scale by predicting a range of political attitudes and behaviours. Study Four shows that, above and beyond the effects of demographics, Māori enrolled to vote on the Māori electoral roll were higher on the Socio-Political Consciousness and Group Membership Evaluation dimensions (Greaves, Osborne, Houkamau, & Sibley, 2017). Additionally, in Study Five, I demonstrate that higher Socio-Political Consciousness for Māori is related to higher levels of support for Māori rights protests, the left-wing Green Party, and the Māori-issue focussed, Māori and Mana political parties (Greaves, Sengupta et al., 2017). Yet, lower levels of Socio-Political Consciousness were related to higher support for the right-wing National Party. Taken together, these studies show that the MMM-ICE2 scale and the Socio-Political Consciousness dimension can predict important, realworld political outcomes and attitudes for Māori. Finally, I discuss the contributions that the papers in this thesis have made to the literature, and the inevitable limitations of the research. I then provide future research directions for the study of quantitative Māori identity and for Māori political participation more generally. I finish with reflections on the process of writing this thesis and on being an emerging Māori quantitative researcher.

The article argues that Maori political participation in New Zealand constitutes a positive example of how the current international standards on indigenous political participation can be implemented at the national level. Notwithstanding the weaknesses of the system and the challenges laying ahead, the combination of the Mixed Member Proportional electoral system, dedicated Maori seats and the establishment of the Maori Party have ensured a Maori voice in Parliament and have broadened the possibilities of effective indigenous participation in the political life of the state. Such state practice that implements the 2007 UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples firmly confirms the position of the Declaration within current international law.

This paper briefly explores the background to Maori representation in Parliament before tracing the development of Labour's acquisition of the Maori vote up until 1996. It then considers the reasons for the loss of that loyalty at the 1996 General Election. It is argued that the populist Maori leader and the deputy leader of the New Zealand First Party had enormous appeal for Maori voters. The impact of this populism and of the MMP electoral system on the Maori electorate is examined. The nature of Labour's response to this unprecedented surge in Maori support for a minor party, and the dynamics of the Maori electoral population are further themes of the paper. Some of the strategies and attitudes Labour must adopt if it is to regain that Maori confidence are also explored.

This paper argues that self-determination to the greatest extent possible is a legitimate aspiration for Maori people. It is argued that in education this requires a philosophical and policy response more focused on Maori autonomy than can be provided within the bicultural framework that has lately informed Maori relationships with other actors in the education arena. The paper considers the place of kohanga reo, kura kaupapa Maori and wananga in relation to broader Maori aspirations for self-determination and discusses proposals that these aspirations be furthered through the establishment of a Maori Education Authority. It is also argued that opportunities for self-determination in New Zealand are compromised by the government's unwillingness to alter a tightly controlled centralised education market to provide genuine Māori autonomy over what type of education might be available and to what end.

In 2004 the appointment of a Coordinating Minister Race Relations, signalled a shift in elite Māori policy thinking from a long-standing cautious bipartisan acceptance of selfdetermination towards a re-emergent assimilationist ‘one law’ for all discourse. The question simplistically posed by the Leader of the Opposition was should welfare entitlements be granted on the basis of need or race (Brash 2004)? Beneath this question lies an ideological assumption which privileges assimilation over indigeneity as the basis of Māori participation in public affairs. This paper therefore asks: are Māori peoples with rights, or individuals with needs? Is there a deeper politics of indigeneity providing a legitimate foundation for rights which are not necessarily superior to the rights of citizenship, but are important and distinguishable adjuncts? These questions transcend the issue of welfare entitlements to wider questions about the nature and terms of Māori belonging to the liberal polity. The paper highlights the political tension between government attempts to remove indigeneity from the public agenda in response to populist pressure and a pragmatic acceptance that New Zealand ‘needs’ Māori to increase their contribution to the national economy and that the realisation of this goal may in fact depend on the fuller citizenship imagined by the politics of indigeneity.

This paper identifies three discourses that are prominent in contemporary Treaty of Waitangi policy debate, each with significantly different implications for Maori political status within the modern nation-state. At one extreme the Treaty's significance is exaggerated by overemphasis on partnership as an implicit Treaty principle. At another extreme the Treaty's significance is understated by an assimilationist position that denies the Treaty's relevance to Indigenous rights which, in turn, imposes serious constraint on the extent to which partnership can actually develop into comprehensive policy practice. An alternative position is one that sees the Treaty, which is supported in international law, as affirming a twofold conception of citizenship as the basis of both individual and collective Maori rights.

This paper examines contemporary debates in Maori politics by responding to the argument of the former leader of the opposition National party, Don Brash, that Maori public policy is most properly based on "need" alone because indigenous status offers no "rights" beyond those of common national citizenship. The paper's alternative argument is that the politics of indigeneity and associated theories of self-determination provide a way of avoiding a general belief that addressing need is all that is required to include Maori fairly in the national polity. It is argued that Maori ought to enjoy rights of indigeneity as the basis of an inclusive, cohesive and fair society.

Reconciliation brings together Christological and anthropological dimensions of human thought to illustrate the nexus between religious principles and political means. For the state reconciliation is concerned with social cohesion and political stability. For the church, it extends the sacramental notion of reconciliation between God and penitent to public relationships. This article examines Roman Catholic contributions to secular reconciliation debates. It shows how religious precepts create moral imperatives to engagement with secular discourses as a necessary element of Christian mission. It also argues that the church’s role in the disruption of indigenous societies creates an additional moral imperative to engage in reconciliation as mission and to articulate a Christian vision of indigenous rights.

Indigenous peoples inevitably associate globalization with imperial expansion and the colonization of their territories. One associated scholarly view is that globalization's focus on capital accumulation sets aside indigenous cultural priorities to undermine self-determining authority over lands and resources (Fenelon and Hall, 2008; Friedman, 1999; Kelsey, 2005a, 2005b; Stewart-Harawira, 2005). Alternatively, globalization is an ambiguous paradox also providing significant benefits to indigenous peoples. In two very different Pacific countries, Fiji and New Zealand, the globalization of political and jurisprudential thought on the rights of indigeneity provides a significant counter to state assertions of absolute sovereignty. Globalization creates economic opportunities to reduce indigenous dependence on the state and in its contemporary expression is less significant than domestic factors in inhibiting indigenous aspirations.

Christian public theology extends reconciliation beyond its principal sacramental concern for relationships between God and penitent to the construction of ‘socially just’ public relationships for the settlement of intra-national conflict. In theological terms, reconciliation brings public relationships into what Hally calls ‘the Christ narrative of passion, death and resurrection’ in which the perpetrators of injustice repent and seek forgiveness. This article introduces the conflicts that these discourses aim to resolve in Australia, Fiji and New Zealand and explains and contrasts reconciliation’s relative importance in each of these jurisdictions. Moreover, the article’s cross-jurisdictional comparison shows reconciliation’s limits and possibilities as public theology, and argues that in Australia and New Zealand it has helped to create political environments willing to admit indigenous perspectives on a range of policy issues. On the contrary, however, the article also shows that the Fijian churches have distorted the concept of reconciliation to support political imperatives that are difficult to rationalize theologically, even though they are presented by the churches as being concerned with religious goals.

This chapter draws on New Zealand examples to contextualize its assessment of reconciliation as public memory in Australian policy discourse. The Treaty of Waitangi has provided the rationale and framework for successive New Zealand governments to say sorry for acts of aggression against Maori tribes. In New Zealand, sorrow is expressed through Acts of Parliament that serve not only as instruments of restitution but as symbols of public memory. Faith and memory are similarly important to wider Christian treaty discourses, as it was Anglican missionaries who drafted the agreement and translated it from English to Maori. The Pastoral letter is drawn into Catholic public memory to justify the development of a public theology of reconciliation. Self-determination belongs first and foremost to individuals, but in Catholic teaching the human person is fundamentally social and exercises the rights and responsibilities of their human being in association with others.

A framework/model based on Māori knowledge, values and perspectives is presented that distinguishes ‘cultural values’ from ‘cultural services’ and extends the definition of cultural values across the whole ecosystem services framework. Māori aspirations and well-being are interdependent on ecosystems and ecosystem services. Ultimately Māori wish to use these ecosystem approaches and frameworks to increase participation and inclusion in decision-making, to achieve multidimensional aspirational goals and desired indigenous outcomes.