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Developing equitable marine management systems that recognise Indigenous worldviews, values, and practices, alongside international initiatives such as Ecosystem-Based Management (EBM) are paramount in countries which aim to recognise Indigenous rights. This is the case for New Zealand (NZ) where Indigenous-Māori rights to partner with the Government for the purpose of environmental management were guaranteed under the Treaty of Waitangi, 1840, and subsequent Acts (e.g. Resource Management Act, 1991). Our aim was to explore how both Indigenous-Māori and NZ societal values can be integrated into a marine co-management decision-making framework. Here we describe the Waka-Taurua (double-canoe) framework, and how it can be applied in developing a NZ marine management system (NZ-MMS), which includes both kaitiakitanga (a Māori concept of reciprocal care between Indigenous-Māori people and their territorial environment), and EBM, equitably. We argue that the Waka-Taurua framework can improve how marine co-management systems are developed by facilitating a more structured and equitable discussion of both Indigenous-Māori and broader societal worldviews, values, and practices.

This article explains that the concept of citizenship for Maori in New Zealand has evolved. The 'Native Rights Act 1865' declared all Maori to be subjects of the Crown. This implication then justified the confiscation of lands in the 1860s from those Maori deemed to be disloyal to the Crown. By the beginning of the twentieth century, politicians began to use the concept of citizenship to force Maori to fight in World War I. In the mid-twentieth century, the Maori politician Apirana Ngata used the term 'price of citizenship' to gain social and political rights for all Maori, as a result of the efforts of Maori soldiers fighting as New Zealand citizens in World War II.

This research, entitled te ao pakihi—the business world—set out to identify Māori enterprise perspectives on the New Zealand-United Kingdom free trade agreement (NZ-UK FTA) being negotiated by Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MFAT) officials and their UK counterparts. In their desire to uphold the Crown’s obligations to Māori under the Treaty of Waitangi, to invoke some of the goals of the Trade for All agenda, and to meet commitments to Māori in trade policy following tribunal claims and the formation of the Te Taumata, MFAT wanted to be informed about Māori interests so that these could be reflected in the negotiations in real time. MFAT commissioned this independent research into Māori enterprise perspectives in March 2021. The research was conducted between April and June 2021 and involved interviews with 50 Māori enterprises with varying degrees of exporting activity, and entity types and scales, including Māori small and medium enterprise (SMEs), Māori post-settlement governance entities (PSGEs), Māori corporates, and Māori providers, among others. Participants were identified and recruited through networks of the research team. Two forms of analysis and reporting were provided: first, a series of six batch reports each summarising the findings of five interviews, with a total of 30 interviewees—the goal was to provide insights as the information came to hand so negotiators could incorporate Māori perspectives during negotiation rounds—and second, a final report with findings from another 24 interviewees, including three from the sixth batch report. We found that that Māori enterprises see trade as more than an economic opportunity: they see the FTA as embodying a Treaty relationship that has significance because it is one with the original Treaty partner—the British Monarch. This relationship provides much cause for optimism among Māori about the potential for trade; however, it also provides cause for caution among Māori enterprises because of historical trauma, and concerns about the dangers of misappropriating and misuse of Māori cultural and intellectual property, and risks to Treaty and other rights. This can be addressed, according to participants, by ensuring Māori are represented at the (negotiating) table, Māori are involved in the implementation, operation, and evaluation of the NZ-UK FTA, and Māori enterprises are supported to build their capability to trade with the UK in a way that respects their identity as Māori enterprises and in accordance with a Māori way of doing business.

He tuhinga tēnei hei whakamārama i te whakatewhatewhatanga i ngā raru o ngā kaipupuri whenua kei ngā whenua tarahiti. Arā noa atu ngā hua kei ngā whenua e takoto ana, heoi anō, arā noa atu ngā aupēhinga ka piri ki ngā whānau kia huihui rātau mō ō rātau whenua. Ko tēnei rangahau ka whai whakaaro mō ngā raru kei roto i ngā Taitara Whenua Māori. Me pēhea e taea ai te whakapakari i ngā hiahia o te whānau kia kore ai e warea te one tapu? 1.4666 miriona heketea o ngā whenua kei ngā ringa o Māori e pupuri ana. E hāngai ana tēnei ki te 5.5% o te katoa o Aotearoa. Ināianei, e 27,308 ngā Taitara whenua, e 2.7 miriona heketea ko taiapahia hei whenua takitahi. Koianei ka titiro ki ētahi raru i puta mai e pā ana ki ngā Kaipupuri Whenua, kei ngā kare ā-roto pea ētahi whakamārama.

The New Zealand government has introduced a COVID-19 domestic vaccine pass to be used in conjunction with the COVID-19 Protection Framework. The Framework is likely to be activated soon after Cabinet meets on 29 November 2021. The pass will be necessary to access places and events that require proof of vaccination under the Framework. This brief does not argue for or against the introduction of a domestic vaccine pass, but rather discusses key issues that it raises for Māori, and suggests actions to address them. We see four key issues: • the lack of Māori involvement, as a Tiriti partner, on either the design or implementation of the COVID-19 domestic vaccine pass; • disproportionate restriction on Māori mobility due to lower Māori vaccination rates; • privacy and data security concerns; • uneven implementation that could increase discrimination against Māori and other groups considered to pose a risk to others’ safety. To respond to these issues we recommend that the implementation of the pass be designed in partnership with Māori and comply with Māori data sovereignty requirements. As Tiriti partners, Māori should expect that the pass will keep their communities safe, while providing opportunities to enact manaakitanga in the matrix of care, and the mana to manage their own affairs.

In 2010, the Electoral (Disqualification of Sentenced Prisoners) Amendment Bill marked a significant change in prisoner voting rights policies in New Zealand, disenfranchising all prisoners regardless of sentence length. A decade later in 2020, the Electoral (Registration of Sentenced Prisoners) Amendment Bill re-enfranchised prisoners serving sentences of less than three years. Over this time, a Waitangi Tribunal Inquiry and a number of Māori politicians and public figures highlighted the disproportionate effects of prisoner disenfranchisement for Māori given over-representation of Māori in the prison population. However, less attention has focused on the specific effects of disenfranchisement for wāhine Māori (Māori women) in prison, and what this reflects about the relationship between wāhine Māori and the state. While women make up a significantly smaller percentage of the general prison population than men, wāhine Māori made up 61% of the women’s prison population in 2021 (Office of the Inspectorate, 2021). Additionally, wāhine Māori had a drastically different experience of colonisation to tāne Māori (Māori men). Colonial actions worked to destroy traditional Māori social organisation, which disrupted the balance between men and women and confined wāhine Māori to a social position that falls behind Pākehā men and women and Māori men. This thesis takes a Māori-centred, Mana Wahine lens to draw on the content of interviews with key informants and analysis of parliamentary readings of the 2010 and 2020 bills in order to explore how prisoner disenfranchisement in the 21st century reflects broader patterns regarding the treatment of wāhine Māori by the state. Disenfranchisement is likely to uniquely affect wāhine Māori due to their importance in te ao Māori as nurturers, the managers of households, and their centrality to the intergenerational transfer of knowledge. This not only presents barriers to voting and re-enrolment on the electoral roll post-release from prison, but also serves to practically disenfranchise the whānau and communities that wāhine Māori belong to. The lack of consideration of the needs and experiences of wāhine Māori in state discussions of prisoner voting rights mirrors the ongoing invisibility of wāhine Māori in state policy. The state has framed prisoner voting rights around male and tāne Māori norms, which cannot account for wāhine Māori. Moving forward, if prisoner voting rights policies are revisited in the future, an intersectional approach must be taken that effectively addresses the needs of wāhine Māori.

“The need for constitutional transformation has become quite clear in the Māori world over the last 12 or 13 years.” — Professor Margaret Mutu.

The Māori Electoral Option is a period of 4 months, every 5 years, when Māori electors can choose whether to be on the Māori or the General Electoral Roll. The outcome of the Māori Electoral Option is a key factor in determining the number of Māori seats in the New Zealand Parliament. The Electoral Commission estimates that approximately 6,000 Māori voters each year request to change electoral roll, but in 2017 over 19,000 voters applied to change. Why were so many more Māori wanting to change and why did they not know they could only change during the Māori Electoral Option held every 5 years? The following year, the 2018 Māori Electoral Option saw the first net increase of Māori changing to the general roll since 1996. This article uses data gathered from the results of Māori Electoral Options 1991–2018, an anonymous survey, and evaluations of Māori Electoral Option campaigns to consider how the shifting trends in roll choices might be explained.

The historical context of colonial legacies and capitalist policies are shaping responses to climate change but so too are non-capitalist and alternative-capitalist practices. Indigenous peoples’ world-views are commonly argued to align with non-capitalist approaches and often said to be the answer to climate change. However, Indigenous peoples are never only ‘ecological natives’ ‘living at one with nature’ but have multiple roles and identities in the political economy. Indigenous world-views could be used in ways to support capitalist practices and policies (which many argue have caused climate change) or to support alternative-capitalist practices (which others argue promote harmonious relationships between humans and the planet).

"Theorising and illustrating diverse, more-than-capitalist economies, this broad-ranging Handbook presents ways in which it is possible to imagine and enact other ways of being. It gathers together empirical examples of diverse economic practices and experiments from across the world, framed by in-depth discussions of key theoretical concepts. Organised into thematic sections, the Handbook moves from looking at diverse forms of enterprise, to labour, transactions, property, and finance as well as decentred subjectivity and diverse economies methodology. Chapters present a wide diversity of economic practices that make up contemporary economies, many of which are ignored or devalued by mainstream economic theory. Pushing the boundaries of economic thinking to include more than human labour and human/non-human interdependence, it highlights the challenges of enacting ethical economies in the face of dominant ways of thinking and being. Economic geography, political economy and development studies scholars will greatly appreciate the empirical examples of diverse economic practices blended with theory throughout the Handbook. It will also benefit policy-makers and practitioners working within diverse economies, or looking to create more ethical ways of living."

I argue environmental disasters are an inevitable outcome of the underdevelopment of Western philosophy. Human induced environmental disasters are unfortunate, an unintended consequence of focusing on economic maximization in a culture without comprehensive, clearly accepted, and operationalized frameworks for environmental and intergenerational justice. However, they are of no surprise to Indigenous Peoples relegated to margins of political influence. Grounding this claim, I examine the New Zealand High Court case Greenpeace and Te Whanau-ā-Apanui vs the Minister for Energy. Case documents afford comparisons between the complex philosophic, legal, and cultural framework of Māori, that protect human and nonhuman from human-induced environmental disaster, and the dominant Anglo framings. I observe a philosophical deficit underpinning the legal and political system of Aotearoa that impedes environmental intergenerational justice. These philosophic foundations, intentionally or not, promote environmental disaster and – nationally and internationally – claim a dominant position over Indigenous systems.

This chapter explores how Maori developmental aspirations require a multidimensional view of economy linked to Maori identity, landscape and worldview. It aims to reframe the Maori, and, by extension, wider concepts of Indigenous economy to one that has meaning to Maori communities, and thus more holistically appreciates the true notion of ‘value’. The chapter presents Maori business case studies that illustrate distinctive elements of connection between Maori worldview, forms of organization and economy. It offers insight into how we might realize meaningful development for Indigenous communities more broadly. Non-economic variables such as relationships, reciprocity and connection are privileged, and matauranga Maori, identity, tikanga Maori, whanaungatanga, whakapapa, and manaakitanga guide Maori business structure, governance and practice. Whai take represents a broader conceptualization of Maori economy that more meaningfully engages the multifaceted nature of Maori socio-economic activity.

Policies increasingly reinforce the self-determination of Indigenous peoples, but issues remain around group definitions. Colonization has led to (de)identification with Māori (New Zealand's Indigenous peoples) identity markers. We explore differences between Māori on combinations of descent, ethnicity and Iwi (extended kinship group) knowledge in the 2013 Census, and self-reported discrimination. There were six groups within the Māori descent population: two did not know their Iwi – some identified solely as Māori ethnicity (2.8 per cent) – or Māori plus another ethnicity(-ies; 6.8 per cent); two did not identify as Māori ethnicity: more named their Iwi (7.2 per cent), than not (6.9 per cent); the largest groups knew their Iwi and identified as Māori ethnicity, either solely (30.8 per cent), or alongside another ethnicity(-ies; 34.3 per cent). We found a pattern of differences across demographics and discrimination, highlighting the complexity of Māori identity and the need to account for differences within Indigenous groups.