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Restrictions on Indigenous peoples’ contributions to policymaking pervade post-settler societies like Australia, Canada and Aotearoa. Such effects are observed in spite of agreements like Te Tiriti o Waitangi in Aotearoa and the United Nations’ Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. Te Tiriti, negotiated between the British Crown and Māori (Indigenous peoples of Aotearoa), may have been entered into honourably by both parties, but the Crown has consistently resisted its implementation. Contemporary colonialism is characterised by the entrenched and on-going displacement of Indigenous people’s authority by settler states, rationalised by race as a determinant of human worth. Impacts include land alienation, unsustainable resource exploitation and marginalising Indigenous voices from opportunities to make policy consistent with Indigenous values and preferred ways of living. Colonialism normalises institutional racism so that public policy outcomes are persistently unjust. This article describes Critical Tiriti Analysis (CTA), an original contribution to transforming colonial policy, which retrospectively evaluates whether any specific policy document is consistent with Te Tiriti. Substantial interest in CTA from policymakers, practitioners, and scholars led to the development of the tool as a prospective guide to making policy that is consistent with authoritative interpretations of Te Tiriti, and therefore, more likely effective in producing public policies which eliminate inequities. CTA was initially focused on health policy and built on a series of questions that arise from our interpretations of the text of Te Tiriti, contemporary Tiriti scholarship and jurisprudence, and our observations of the ways in which the method is being used by ourselves and others. Although deeply grounded in Aotearoa, we argue that CTA may be transferable to other colonial contexts, such as the Australian where treaties between First Nations and the state are being contemplated, and Canada which has passed legislation to implement the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.

In both Australia and New Zealand, Indigenous peoples have called for alternative non-colonial political arrangements. In October 2023, Australians voted in a referendum against distinctive Indigenous participation in public policymaking, which had been proposed as a step toward a more inclusive political system. On the same day, New Zealand elected a new Parliament, leading to the formation of a government comprising three parties that had campaigned against what they saw as excessive Māori political influence. Comparing these developments and the histories of the two countries raises questions about liberal equality, democratic citizenship, and whether all or just some citizens should own the liberal democratic state.

Te Pati Māori (The Māori Party) proposes removing the British monarch as head of state so that Te Tiriti o Waitangi’s (the Māori text of the Treaty of Waitangi) (Te Tiriti) promise of fulfilling partnership may be realized. The ACT (Association of Consumers and Taxpayers) Party’s alternative argument is that partnership is among a body of treaty principles that give Māori people (Indigenous peoples of New Zealand) political advantage over others. These alternative perspectives transcend time because neither partnership nor equality as the ACT party presents it meets the possibilities of liberal democratic citizenship that may be read into Te Tiriti. Instead, equality is enhanced by interpreting Te Tiriti as constituting a commonwealth with hapū (sub-tribes) as existing political communities, and kāwanatanga (government) as a new one, with powers and responsibilities grounded in equal tikanga (cultural practices and proper conduct). The powers of government may then be shared, through participatory parity.

During the 1980s and 1990s biculturalism was the ascendant political philosophy for managing the relationship between the New Zealand Crown and the indigenous Maori population. Biculturalism understood Maori politics as a partnership between Maori and the state, grounded in the Treaty of Waitangi, the agreement signed in 1840 from which British government was established. Biculturalism was presented as morally superior to multiculturalism which was understood as setting aside Maori Treaty rights and rights of prior occupancy in favour of less substantive rights available to Maori as one of many ethnic minorities. However, a deeper reading of multicultural political theory provides an instructive critique of biculturalism's inherent limits from the perspective of the Maori right to self-determination. It shows why biculturalism's influence waned. It also shows why Matike Mai o Aotearoa, a blueprint for constitutional transformation commissioned by tribal leaders is unlikely to succeed as a contemporary attempt to reassert biculturalism's influence. Multicultural theory is not a panacea for the right to self-determination, but it does not restrict the development of a broader Maori-centred differentiated liberal citizenship in the ways that biculturalism precludes.

This article draws on the politics of indigeneity to distinguish the claims of first occupancy from simple ethnic identity politics, illustrating that relative political marginalization in Australasia is not so much a function of minority status but of indigeneity itself. The politics of indigeneity's aim is to create political space for self-determination and a particular indigenous share in the sovereign authority of the nation-state itself. The Australasian states are compared with Fiji to demonstrate that the significance of historical constraints on political authority transcend the withdrawal of a colonial power and the restoration of collective indigenous majority population status.

In 2004 the appointment of a Coordinating Minister Race Relations, signalled a shift in elite Maori policy thinking from a long-standing cautious bipartisan acceptance of self-determination towards a re-emergent assimilationist 'one law' for all discourse. The question simplistically posed by the Leader of the Opposition was should welfare entitlements be granted on the basis of need or race? (Brash 2004). Beneath this question lies an ideological assumption which privileges assimilation over indigeneity as the basis of Maori participation in public affairs. This paper therefore asks: are Maori peoples with rights, or individuals with needs? Is there a deeper politics of indigeneity providing a legitimate foundation for rights which are not necessarily superior to the rights of citizenship, but are important and distinguishable adjuncts? These questions transcend the issue of welfare entitlements to wider questions about the nature and terms of Maori belonging to the liberal polity. The paper highlights the political tension between government attempts to remove indigeneity from the public agenda in response to populist pressure and a pragmatic acceptance that New Zealand 'needs' Maori to increase their contribution to the national economy and that the realisation of this goal may in fact depend on the fuller citizenship imagined by the politics of indigeneity.

This paper explores the implications of prevailing political thought for the extent to which Māori (native to New Zealand) are able to pursue self-determination, which, although theoretically legitimate, is constrained by elite political pragmatism. While the long-fashionable bicultural paradigm offers some opportunity for self-determination, its utility for meeting Māori aspiration was further limited by the change in political climate following the National Party Leader Don Brash's Nationhood speech in 2004 and by the Foreshore and Seabed Act of 2004. These events encouraged and legitimised a renewed public suspicion of Māori aspiration so that the political space available for the pursuit of self-determination was reduced.

This paper demonstrates that the philosophical premises underlying biculturalism and self-determination lead to different conclusions about where power properly resides with respect to Crown/Maori relations in New Zealand. It is argued that biculturalism is not the panacea for the realisation of legitimate Maori aspirations that has been assumed by both Maori and Pakeha policy elites over the past twenty years because it makes assumptions about power relationships which limit greater degrees of Maori autonomy ' one step towards self-determination is permitted, but the next prevented. Biculturalism can not realise greater autonomy because it is concerned primarily with relationships among people in institutional settings and within and among bureaucratic institutions. Therefore it is less likely to meet Maori aspirations than self-determination which is concerned with creating, to the greatest extent possible, independence and autonomy for groups, not necessarily in isolation from wider society, but certainly apart from controls and regulations imposed from outside the would be self-determining community. Self-determination locates power, at least to some extent, within traditional Maori social units, while biculturalism, although assuming a sharing of power, inevitably gives Maori the status of junior partner in a project designed to modify state institutions to make them more responsive to Maori interests. While in itself this is advantageous to Maori, biculturalism is not a substitute for the affirmation of traditional social structures as the central point in a Maori quest for greater independence from an historically intrusive state.

Background Te Tiriti o Waitangi was negotiated between the British Crown and Indigenous Māori leaders of Aotearoa New Zealand in 1840. Māori understood the agreement as an affirmation of political authority and a guarantee of British protection of their lands and resources. The Crown understood it as a cession of sovereignty. The tension remains, though legal and political developments in the last 35 years, have established that the agreement places a mandatory obligation on the Crown to protect and promote Māori health. It also requires that Māori may exercise rangatiratanga, or responsibility and authority, in relation to health policy development and implementation. Methods Te Tiriti is, then, an instrument against which health policy is justly and efficaciously evaluated. This paper introduces critical Tiriti analysis as such an evaluative method. Critical Tiriti analysis involves reviewing policy documents against the Preamble and the Articles of te Tiriti o Waitangi. The review process has five defined phases: (i) orientation; (ii) close reading; (iii) determination; (iv) strengthening practice and (v) Māori final word. Results We present a working example of critical Tiriti analysis using the New Zealand Government’s Primary Health Care Strategy published in 2001. This policy analysis found poor alignment with te Tiriti overall and the indicators of its implementation that we propose. Conclusion This paper provides direction to policy makers wanting to improve Māori health outcomes and ensure Māori engagement, leadership and substantive authority in the policy process. It offers an approach to analysing policy that is simple to use and, inherently, a tool for advancing social justice.

Te Tiriti o Waitangi, a treaty negotiated between Māori (the Indigenous peoples of Aotearoa) and the British Crown, affirmed Māori sovereignty and guaranteed the protection of hauora (health). The Waitangi Tribunal, established in 1975 to investigate alleged breaches of the agreement, released a major report in 2019 (registered as WAI 2575) about breaches of te Tiriti within the health sector in relation to primary care, legislation, and health policy. This article explores the implications of this report for the New Zealand health sector and the decolonial transformation of health systems. The tribunal found that the Crown has systematically contravened obligations under te Tiriti across the health sector. We complement the tribunal’s findings, through critical analysis, to make five substantive recommendations: (1) the adoption of Tiriti-compliant legislation and policy; (2) recognition of extant Māori political authority (tino rangatiratanga); (3) strengthening of accountability mechanisms; (4) investment in Māori health; and (5) embedding equity and anti-racism within the health sector. These recommendations are critical for upholding te Tiriti obligations. We see these requirements as making significant contributions to decolonizing health systems and policy in Aotearoa and thereby contributing to aspirations for health equity as a transformative concept.

The British relied on the legal fiction known as the Doctrine of Discovery to dispossess Māori of Aotearoa New Zealand and the Indigenous Peoples of Canada, the United States and Australia and to violently take over their territories. British colonisation continues to severely disadvantage these Indigenous Peoples who have never given up their fight to recover their lands, resources, and power. This chapter draws on the work of Indigenous scholars to provide a very brief overview of just some of the methods adopted by the British to dispossess the Indigenous Peoples of Canada, the United States and Australia and the struggles in those countries to achieve land restitution. It then considers the situation for Māori in more detail. It provides an overview of the schemes the British dreamt up to steal Māori land and the steps Māori have taken as we tried to achieve land and resource restitution over the past century.

In the second half of the nineteenth century, settlers poured into Aotearoa demanding land. Millions of acres were acquired by the government or directly by settlers; or confiscated after the Land Wars.By 1891, when the Liberal government came to power, Maori retained only a fraction of their lands. And still the losses continued. For rangatira such as James Carroll, Wiremu Pere, Paora Tuhaere, Te Keepa Te Rangihiwinui, and many others, the challenges were innumerable. To stop further land loss, some rangatira saw parliamentary process as the mechanism; others pursued political independence.For over two decades, Maori men and women of outstanding ability fought hard to protect their people and their land. How those rangatira fared, and how they should be remembered, is the story of Maori political struggle during the Liberal era.

This article explores some of the key features of co-governance, or shared decision making, between Māori and the Crown. Co-governance models create the conditions for making better decisions by sharing decision making with Māori where Māori communities have a distinctive interest. Such models are able to draw on the distinctive experiences, knowledge and expertise that Māori communities can bring. Shared decision making enhances the legitimacy and durability of decisions by giving effect to rights under te Tiriti o Waitangi. The article also identifies some key principles of effective co-governance and provides some brief examples where shared decision making is being implemented to illustrate the range of situations in which such models are applicable.

New Zealand is a peaceful nation, but ongoing political tensions and inequities between Māori (the indigenous peoples of New Zealand) and Pākehā (the majority group of Europeans) persist as a result of its colonial history. Identifying ways to redress the enduring legacy of colonialism are therefore of critical importance. Accordingly, this paper examines data from 7017 Māori, as well as 37,233 Pākehā, to examine the impact of regional-level Pākehā warmth towards Māori on Māori support for progressive collective action. Results reveal that Pākehā warmth towards Māori varies markedly across 257 regional wards (regional units created for New Zealand electoral purposes). Moreover, multilevel modelling demonstrates that Pākehā warmth towards Māori at the region-level correlates positively with Māori identity and political efficacy at the individual level which, in turn, both correlate positively with collective action support. Collectively, these results demonstrate the impact of the broader social climate on social change, while identifying a previously-unknown facilitator of collective action support (namely, a broader context of warmth towards structurally disadvantaged groups).

Kaupapa Maori theory is broadly underpinned by a politics that has strategically promoted forms of cultural essentialism and oppositional political stances/power analyses, which have been useful to the revitalisation of culture and the assertion of rights and recognition. Although they serve Maori struggles, these positions often become less self-consciously strategic, and more often lead to accepted political orthodoxy. At the same time, Kaupapa Maori has asserted the importance of theory developed from indigenous - Maori ways of thinking and acting. In this article I contribute to such a project by reflecting on Maori cultural ethics and what they might offer to theorising social and political relations beyond the oppositional colonised-coloniser binary. With particular reference to the work of Emmanuel Levinas, I argue that Maori orientations suggest an imperative to relationship - not opposition, and to responsibility for others - not simply the assertion of rights claims. A politics informed by Maori cultural ethics glimpses a different, certainly riskier, but ultimately more radical and productive politics.

Recently, the Australian government apologised to the “stolen generation” for past abuses. The apology had been long awaited and when delivered was well received by the indigenous people of Australia and the world in general. The question was then raised in the New Zealand parliament as to why Māori had not yet received a similar apology from the New Zealand government. The abuse of Māori by past governments is well documented involving not only land theft and illegal confiscations but numerous human rights abuses including racial discrimination, murder, armed aggression, and illegal incarceration. If reconciliation between Māori and Pākehā is an important part of nation building then an apology would seem to be in order. The concept of trans-generational justice is as valid as trans-generational resource transfer and trans-generational obligations. The argument supporting trans-generational justice is based on the authority of government residing not with individuals but with the office of government itself. Without an apology the marginalization of Māori will be difficult to overcome. This essay examines reasons why Māori should or should not receive an apology from the New Zealand government.

Different participatory mechanisms for the representation of Indigenous peoples have been proposed across states. Since their creation in 1867, the Māori electorates in the national Parliament have led to dedicated representation for Māori (Indigenous peoples of New Zealand). However, only half of Māori choose to vote on the Māori roll, the remainder choosing to vote on the General roll, illustrating that roll choice is not based simply on group representation. This survey aimed to ask Māori (N = 1,958) in their own words why they made their roll choice. Through a deductive codebook thematic analysis, a range of codes were constructed around the reasoning behind roll choice. Māori on the Māori roll made their choice because they valued Māori representation; as an expression of their identity; to support the electorates; as a strategic choice; or they had been influenced by others or through education. Those on the General roll felt their roll was the default or a more familiar option; the Māori roll had less of an impact; it was a strategic choice, or they appreciated greater candidate variety; or they valued the smaller geographic electorate size. Some felt Māori no longer needed separate representation or felt less connected to their identity as Māori. The results have implications for both Māori and Indigenous representation through dedicated representational mechanisms.